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Abstract
Organizations that collect and use large volumes of personal information of-
ten use security audits to protect data subjects from inappropriate uses of this in-
formation by authorized insiders. In face of unknown incentives of employees, a
reasonable audit strategy for the organization (defender) is one that minimizes his
regret. While regret minimization has been extensively studied in repeated games,
a repeated game cannot capture the full complexity of the interaction between the
organization (defender) and an insider (adversary) that arises from dependence
of rewards and actions on history. We introduce a richer class of games called
bounded memory games, which can provide a more accurate model of the audit
process. The standard notion of regret for repeated games is no longer suitable
because actions and rewards can depend on the history of play. To account for
this generality, we introduce the notion of k-adaptive regret, which compares the
reward obtained by playing actions prescribed by the algorithm against a hypothet-
ical k-adaptive adversary with the reward obtained by the best expert in hindsight
against the same adversary. Roughly, a hypothetical k-adaptive adversary adapts
her strategy to the defender’s actions exactly as the real adversary would within
each window of k rounds. A k-adaptive adversary is a natural model for tempor-
ary employees who stay for a certain number of audit cycles and are then replaced
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by a different person. Our definition is parametrized by a set of experts, which can
include both fixed and adaptive defender strategies.
We investigate the inherent complexity of and design algorithms for ad-
aptive regret minimization in bounded memory games of perfect and imperfect
information. We prove a hardness result showing that, with imperfect information,
any k-adaptive regret minimizing algorithm (with fixed strategies as experts) must
be inefficient unless NP = RP even when playing against an oblivious adversary.
In contrast, for bounded memory games of perfect and imperfect information we
present approximate 0-adaptive regret minimization algorithms against an oblivi-
ous adversary running in time nO(1).
1 Introduction
Online learning algorithms that minimize regret provide strong guarantees in situations
that involve repeatedly making decisions in an uncertain environment. There is a well
developed theory for regret minimization in repeated games [1]. The goal of this paper
is to study regret minimization for a richer class of settings. As a motivating example
consider a hospital (defender) where a series of temporary employees or business affil-
iates (adversary) access patient records for legitimate purposes (e.g., treatment or pay-
ment) or inappropriately (e.g., out of curiosity about a family member or for financial
gain). The hospital conducts audits to catch the violators, which involves expending
resources in the form of time spent in human investigation. On the other hand, viol-
ations that are missed internally and caught externally (by Government audits, patient
complaints, etc.) also result in various losses such as repuation loss, loss due to lit-
igation, etc. The hospital wants to minimize its overall loss by balancing the cost of
audits with the risk of externally detected violations. In these settings with unknown
adversary incentives, a reasonable strategy for the defender is one that minimizes her
regret.
Modeling this interaction as a repeated game of imperfect information is challen-
ging because this game has two additional characteristics that are not captured by a
repeated game model: (1) History-dependent rewards: The payoff function depends
not only on the current outcome but also on previous outcomes. For example, when
a violation occurs the hospital might experience a greater loss if other violations have
occured in recent history. (2) History-dependent actions: Both players may adapt their
strategies based on history. For example, if many violations have been detected and
punished in recent history then a rational employee might choose to lay low rather than
committing another violation.
Instead, we capture this form of history dependence by introducing bounded memory
games, a subclass of stochastic games 1. In each round of a two-player bounded-
memory-m game, both players simultaneously play an action, observe an outcome and
receive a reward. In contrast to a repeated game, the payoffs may depend on the state
of the game. In contrast to a general stochastic game, the rewards may only depend
1Stochastic games [2] are expressive enough to model history dependence. However, there is no regret
minimization algorithm for the general class of stochastic games. While we do not view this result as
surprising or novel, we include it in Appendix C for completeness.
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on the outcomes from the last m rounds (e.g., violations that were caught in the last m
rounds) as well as the actions of the players in the current round.
In a bounded memory game, the standard notion of regret for a repeated game is not
suitable because the adversary may adapt her actions based on the history of play. To
account for this generality, we introduce (in Section 4) the notion of k-adaptive regret,
which compares the reward obtained by playing actions prescribed by the algorithm
against a hypothetical k-adaptive adversary with the reward obtained by the best expert
in hindsight against the same adversary. Roughly, a hypothetical k-adaptive adversary
plays exactly the same actions as the real adversary except in the last k rounds where
she adapts her strategy to the defender’s actions exactly as the real adversary would.
When k = 0, this definition coincides with the standard definition of an oblivious
adversary considered in defining regret for repeated games. When k = ∞ we get
a fully adaptive adversary. A k-adaptive adversary is a natural model for temporary
employees (e.g., residents, contractors) who stay for a certain number of audit cycles
and are then replaced by a different person. Our definition is parameterized by a set
of experts, which can include both fixed and adaptive defender strategies. In section
5 we use the example of a police chief enforcing the speed limit at a popular tourist
destination (or a hospital auditing accesses to the patient records made by residents) to
illustrate the power of k-adaptive regret minimization when the defender plays against
a series of temporary adversaries.
Next, we investigate the inherent complexity of and design algorithms for adaptive
regret minimization in bounded-memory games of perfect and imperfect information.
Our results are summarized in Table 1. We prove a hardness result (Section 6; The-
orem 1) showing that, with imperfect information, any k-adaptive regret minimizing
algorithm (with fixed strategies as experts) must be inefficient unless NP = RP even
when playing against an oblivious adversary and even when k = 0. In fact, the result
is even stronger and applies to any γ-approximate k-adaptive regret minimizing al-
gorithm (ensuring that the regret bound converges to γ rather than 0 as the number of
rounds T → ∞) for γ < 18nβ where n is the number of states in the game and β > 0.
Our hardness reduction from MAX3SAT uses the state of the bounded-memory game
and the history-dependence of rewards in a critical way.
We present an inefficient k-adaptive regret minimizing algorithm by reducing the
bounded-memory game to a repeated game. The algorithm is inefficient for bounded-
memory games when the number of experts is exponential in the number of states of
the game (e.g., if all fixed strategies are experts). In contrast, for bounded-memory
games of perfect information, we present an efficient nO(1/γ) time γ-approximate 0-
adaptive regret minimization algorithm against an oblivious adversary for any constant
γ > 0 (Section 7;Theorem 4). We also show how this algorithm can be adapted to
get an efficient γ-approximate 0-adaptive regret minimization algorithm for bounded-
memory games of imperfect information (Section 7;Theorem 5). The main novelty in
these algorithms is an implicit weight representation for an exponentially large set of
adaptive experts, which includes all fixed strategies.
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Imperfect Information Perfect Information
Oblivious Regret (k = 0) Hard (Theorem 1) APX (Theorem 4)
APX (Theorem 5)
k-Adaptive Regret (k ≥ 1) Hard (Theorem 1) Hard (Remark 2 )
Fully Adaptive Regret (k =∞) X (Theorem 6) X (Theorem 6)
Table 1: Regret Minimization in Bounded Memory Games
X - no regret minimization algorithm exists
Hard - unless NP = RP no regret minimization algorithm is efficiently computable
APX - efficient approximate regret minimization algorithms exist.
2 Related Work
A closely related work is the Regret Minimizing Audit (RMA) mechanism of Blocki
et al. [3], which uses a repeated game model for the audit process. RMA deals with
history-dependent rewards under certain assumptions about the defender’s payoff func-
tion, but it does not consider history-dependent actions. While RMA provides strong
performance guarantees for the defender against a byzantine adversary, the perform-
ance of RMA may be far from optimal when the adversary is rational (or nearly ra-
tional). In subsequent work the same authors [4] introduced a model of a nearly ra-
tional adversary who behaves in a rational manner most of the time. A nearly rational
adversary can usually be deterred from committing policy violations by high inspec-
tion and punishment levels. They suggested that the defender commit to his strategy
before each audit round (e.g., by publically releasing its inspection and punishment
levels) as in a Stackelberg game [5]. However, the paper gives no efficient algorithm
for computing the Stackelberg equilibrium.
More recent work by Blocki et al. introduced the notion of Audit Games [6]
— a simplified game theoretic model of the audit process in which the adversary is
purely rational (unlike the nearly rational adversary of [4]). Audit Games generalize
the model of Security Games [7] by including punishment level as part of the defend-
ers action space. Because the punishment parameter introduces quadratic constraints
into the optimization problem that must be solved to compute the Stackelberg equilib-
ria, this apparently small change makes it difficult to find the Stackelberg equilibria.
The primary technical contribution of [4] is an efficient algorithm for computing the
Stackelberg equilibrium of Audit Games. There are two potential advantages of the
k-adaptive regret framework compared with the Stackelberg equilibria appraoch: (1)
The k-adaptive regret minimization algorithm can be used even if the adversary’s in-
centives are unknown, and (2) A k-adaptive adversary is a better model for a short
term adversary (e.g., contractors, tourists) who may not informed about the defender’s
policy — and therefore may not even know what the ‘rational’ best response is in a
Stackelberg game. See section 5 for additional discussion.
Stochastic games were defined by Shapley [2]. Much of the work on stochastic
games has focused on finding and computing equilibria for these games [2, 8]. There
has been lot of work in regret minimization for repeated games [1]. Regret minimiz-
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ation in stochastic games has not been the subject of much research. Papadimitriou
and Yannakakis showed that many natural optimization problems relating to stochastic
games are hard [9]. These results don’t apply to bounded memory games. Golovin and
Krause recently showed that a simple greedy algorithm can be used when a stochastic
optimization problem satisfies a property called adaptive submodularity [10]. In gen-
eral, bounded memory games do not satisfy this property. Even-Dar, et al., show that
regret minimization is possible for a class of stochastic games (Markov Decision Pro-
cesses) in which the adversary chooses the reward function at each state but does not
influence the transitions [11]. They also prove that if the adversary controls the re-
ward function and the transitions, then it is NP-Hard to even approximate the best
fixed strategy. Mannor and Shimkin [12] show that if the adversary completely con-
trols the transition model (a Controlled Markov Process) then it is possible to separate
the stochastic game into a series of matrix games and efficiently minimize regret in
each matrix game. Bounded-memory games are a different subset of stochastic games
where the transitions and rewards are influenced by both players. While our hardness
proof shares techniques with Even-Dar, et al., [11], there are significant differences that
arise from the bounded-memory nature of the game. We provide a detailed comparison
in Section 6.
In a recent paper, Even-Dar, et al., [13] handle a few specific global cost functions
related to load balancing. These cost functions depend on history. In their setting, the
adversary obliviously plays actions from a joint distribution. In contrast, we consider
arbitrary cost functions with bounded dependence on history and adaptive adversaries.
Takimoto and Warmuth [14] developed an efficient online shortest path algorithm.
In their setting the experts consists of all fixed paths from the source to the destination.
Because there may be exponentially many paths their algorithm must use an implicit
weight representation. Awerbuch and Kleinberg later provided a general framework for
online linear optimization [15]. In our settings, an additional challenge arises because
experts adapt to adversary actions. See Section 7 for a more detailed comparison.
Farias, et al., [16] introduce a special class of adversaries that they call “flexible”
adversaries. A defender playing against a flexible adversary can minimize regret by
learning the average expected reward of every expert. Our work differs from theirs
in two ways. First, we work with a stochastic game as opposed to a repeated game.
Second, our algorithms can handle a sequence of different k-adaptive adversaries in-
stead of learning a single flexible adversary strategy. A single k-adaptive strategy is
flexible, but a sequence of k-adaptive adversaries is not.
3 Preliminaries
Bounded-memory games are a sub-class of stochastic games, in which outcomes and
states satisfy certain properties. Formally, a two-player stochastic game between an
attacker A and a defender D is given by (XD,XA,Σ, P, τ), where XA and XD are
the actions spaces for players A and D, respectively, Σ is the state space, P : Σ ×
XD × XA → [0, 1] is the payoff function and τ : Σ × XD × XA × {0, 1}∗ → Σ is
the randomized transition function linking the different states. Thus, the payoff during
round t depends on the current state (denoted σt) in addition to the actions of the
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defender (dt) and the adversary (at). We use n = |Σ| to denote the number of states.
A bounded-memory game with memory m (m ∈ N) is a stochastic game with the
following properties: (1) The game satisfies independent outcomes, and (2) The states
Σ = Om encode the last m outcomes, i.e., σi = (Oi−1, . . . , Oi−m). An outcome of
a given round of play is a signal observed by both players (called “public signal” in
games [17]). Outcomes depend probabilistically on the actions taken by the players.
We useO to denote the outcome space andOt ∈ O to denote the outcome during round
t. We say that a game satisfies independent outcomes ifOt is conditionally independent
of
(
O1, ..., Ot−1
)
given dt and at. Notice that the defender and the adversary in a game
with independent outcomes may still select their actions based on history. However,
once those actions have been selected, the outcome is independent of the game history.
Note that a repeated game is a bounded-memory-0 game (a bounded-memory game
with memory m = 0).
A game in which players only observe the outcome Ot after round t but not the
actions taken during a round is called an imperfect information game. If both players
also observe the actions then the game is a perfect information game.
The history of a game H =
(
O1, O2, . . . , Oi, . . . , Ot
)
, is the sequence of out-
comes. We use Hk to denote the k most recent outcomes in the game (i.e., Hk =(
Ot−k+1; . . . ;Ot
)), and t = |H | to denote the total number of rounds played. We use
Hi to denote the first i outcomes in a history (i.e., Hi = (O1, . . . , Oi)), and H ;H ′ to
denote concatenation of histories H and H ′.
A fixed strategy for the defender in a stochastic game is a function f : Σ → XD
mapping each state to a fixed action. F denotes the set of all fixed strategies.
4 Definition of Regret
As discussed earlier, regret minimization in repeated games has received a lot of at-
tention [18]. Unfortunately, the standard definition of regret in repeated games does
not directly apply to stochastic games. In a repeated game, regret is computed by
comparing the performance of the defender strategy D with the performance of a fixed
strategy f . However, in a stochastic game, the actions of the defender and the adversary
in round i influence payoffs in each round for the rest of the game. Thus, it is unclear
how to choose a meaningful fixed strategy f as a reference. We solve this conundrum
by introducing an adversary-based definition of regret.
4.1 Adversary Model
We define a parameterized class of adversaries called k-adaptive adversaries, where the
parameter k denotes the level of adaptiveness of the adversary. Formally, we say that
an agent is k-adaptive if its strategy A(H) is defined by a function f : O∗ × N→ XA
such that A(H) = f (Hi, t), where i = t mod (k + 1). Recall that Hi is the i most
recent outcomes, and t = |H |.
As special cases we define an oblivious adversary (k = 0) and a fully adaptive ad-
versary (k =∞). Oblivious adversaries essentially play without any memory of the
previous outcomes. Fully adaptive adversaries, on the other hand, choose their actions
6
based on the entire outcome history since the start of the game. k-adaptive adversaries
lie somewhere in between. At the start of the game, they act as fully adaptive ad-
versaries, playing with the entire outcome history in mind. But, different from fully
adaptive adversaries, every k rounds, they “forget” about the entire history of the game
and act as if the whole game was starting afresh. As discussed earlier, there are nu-
merous practical instances where k-adaptive adversaries are an appropriate model; for
instance, in games in which one player (e.g., a firm) has a much longer length of play
than the adversary (e.g., a temporary employee), it may be judicious to model the ad-
versary as k-adaptive. In particular, k-adaptive adversaries are similar to the notion of
“patient” players in long-run games discussed by [19]. Their notion of “fully patient”
players correspond to fully adaptive adversaries, “myopic” players correspond to obli-
vious adversaries, and “not myopic but less patient” players correspond to k-adaptive
adversaries.
Another possible adversary definition could be to consider a sliding window of size
k as the adversary memory. But, because such an adversary can play actions to remind
herself of events in the arbitrary past, her memory is not actually bounded by k, and
regret minimization is not possible. See Appendix C for more discussion.
AKD and AKA denote all possible K-adaptive strategies for the defender and ad-
versary, respectively.
4.2 k-Adaptive Regret
Suppose that the defenderD and the adversaryA have produced historyH in a gameG
lasting T rounds. Let a1, ..., aT denote the sequence of actions played by the adversary.
In hindsight we can construct a hypothetical k-adaptive adversary Ak as follows:
Ak (H
′) = A
(
Ht−i;H ′i
)
,
where t = |H ′| and i = t mod (k + 1). In other words, the hypothetical k-adaptive
adversary replicates the plays the real adversary made in the actual game regardless
of the strategy of the defender he is playing against, except for the last i rounds under
consideration where he adapts his strategy to the defender’s actions in the same manner
the real adversary would.
Abusing notation slightly we write P (f,A,G, σ0, T ) to denote the expected payoff
the defender would receive over T rounds of G given that the defender plays strategy
f , the adversary uses strategy A and the initial state of the bounded-memory game G
is σ0. We use P¯ (f,A,G, T ) = P (f,A,G, σ0, T ) /T to denote the average per-round
payoff. We use
R¯k (D,A,G, T, S) = max
f∈S
P¯ (f,Ak, G, T )− P¯ (D,Ak, G, T ) ,
to denote the k-adaptive regret of the defender strategy D using a fixed set S of experts
against an adversary strategy A for T rounds of the game G.
Definition 1. A defender strategy D using a fixed set S of experts is a γ-approximate
k-adaptive regret minimization algorithm for the class of games G if and only if for
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every adversary strategy A, every ǫ > 0 and every game G ∈ G there exists T ′ > 0
such that ∀T > T ′
R¯k (D,A,G, T, S) < ǫ+ γ .
If γ = 0 then we simply refer to D as a k-adaptive regret minimization algorithm. If D
runs in time poly (n, 1/ǫ) we call D efficient.
k-adaptive regret considers a k-adaptive hypothetical adversary who can adapt
within each window of size (at most) k + 1. Intuitively, as k increases this meas-
ure of regret is more meaningful (as the hypothetical adversary increasingly resembles
the real adversary), albeit harder to minimize.
There are two important special cases to consider: k = 0 (oblivious regret) and
k = ∞ (adaptive regret). Adaptive regret is the strongest measure of regret. Observe
that if the actual adversary is k-adaptive then the hypothetical adversary A∞ is same
as the hypothetical adversary Ak , and hence R¯∞ = R¯k. Also, if the actual adversary
is oblivious then R¯∞ = R¯0 = R¯k.
In this paper G will typically denote the class of perfect/imperfect information
bounded-memory games with memory m. We are interested in expert sets S which
contain all of the fixed strategies F ⊆ S.
5 Audit Examples
As an example, consider the interaction between a police chief (defender) and drivers
(adversary) at a popular tourist destination. The police chief is given the task of enfor-
cing speed limits on local roads. Each day the police chief may deploy resources (e.g.,
radar, policemen) to monitor local roads, and drivers decide whether or not to speed or
not.
Repeated Game We first model the interaction above using a repeated game. We
will consider a simple version of this interaction in which the defender has two actions
XD = {HI,LI} ,
and the adversary has two actions
XA = {S,DS} .
Here, HI/LI stands for high/low inspection and S/DS stands for speed and don’t speed.
We consider the defender utilities in table 2.
Actions S DS
HI .19 0.7
LI 0.2 1
Table 2: Speeding
Game — Defender
Utility P
In this example, the costs of a higher inspection outweigh
the benefits of enforcing the policy. In any Nash Equilibria the
defender will play his dominant strategy — “always play LI.”
Similarly, any algorithm that minimizes regret in the standard
sense (0-adaptive) — like the regret minimizing audit mech-
anism from [3] — must eventually converge to the dominant
defender strategy LI. While this is the best that the defender
can do against a byzantine adversary, this may not always be
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the best result for the defender when playing against a rational
adversary. Consider the adversary’s utility defined in table 3.
Actions S DS
HI 0 0.8
LI 1 0.8
Table 3: Speeding
Game — Adversary
Utility
If the defender plays his dominant strategy then the ad-
versary will always play the action S — speed. This action pro-
file results in average utility 0.2 for the defender and 1 for the
adversary. However, if the defender can commit to his strategy
in advance then he can play his Stackelberg equilibrium [5]
strategy “play HI with probability 0.2 and LI with probabil-
ity 0.8.” A rational adversary will respond by playing her best
response — the action that maximizes her utility given the de-
fenders commitment. In this case the adversary’s best response
is to play DS. The resulting utility for the defender is 0.94!
There are two practical challenges with adopting this approach: (1) If the utility
of the adversary is unknown then the defender cannot compute the Stackelberg equi-
librium. (2) Even if the defender commits to playing a Stackelberg equilibrium it is
unlikely that many drivers will respond in purely rational manner for the simple reason
that they are uniformed (e.g., a tourist may not know whether or not speed limits are
aggressively enforce in an unfamiliar area). If the adversary can learn the Stackelberg
Equilibrium from a history of the defender’s actions, then she might adapt her play to
the best response strategy over time. However, each tourist has a limited time win-
dow in which she can make these observations and adjust her behavior (e.g., the tourist
leaves after at most k days).
Bounded Memory Game Model with k-adaptive regret We model the interaction
above using bounded memory games with k-adaptive adversary model. In each round
of our bounded memory game the defender and the adversary play an action profile,
and observe an outcome — a public signal. The action space in our bounded memory
game is identical to the repeated game, and the outcome O = {HI,LI} is simply the
defender’s action. That is we assume that our tourist driver can observe the defender’s
inspection level in each round (e.g., by counting the number of police cars by the side of
the road). The defender’s payoff function is identical to table 2 — the defender’s pay-
off is independent of the current state (e.g., rewards in this particular bounded memory
game are not history-dependent). A k-adaptive regret minimization algorithm could be
run without a priori knowledge of the adversary’s utility, and will converge to the op-
timal fixed strategy against any k-adaptive adversary (e.g., any sequence of k-adaptive
tourist strategies).
It is reasonable to use a k-adaptive strategy to model the behavior of our tourist
drivers. Each tourist initially has no history of the defender’s actions — during the first
day of her visit a tourist must make the decision about whether or not to speed without
any history of the defender’s actions. After the first day the tourist may adapt his
behavior based on previous outcomes. For example, a tourist might adopt the following
k-adaptive strategy: A1 = “Play DS on the first day, and on the remaining (k−1) days
play S if the defender has never played HI previously, otherwise play DS.” After k
days the tourist leaves and a new tourist arrives. This new tourist may adopt a different
k-adaptive strategy (e.g., A2 = “Play S on the first day, and on the remaining (k − 1)
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days play S if the defender has never played HI previously, otherwise play DS.”).
We set the memory of our bounded memory game to be m = k. Now the fixed
defender strategies F in our bounded memory game include strategies like f = “play
HI every k’th round”. Suppose for example that k = 7 and the defender plays f . In this
case the sequence of rewards that the defender would see against the first k-adaptive
adversaryA1 would be (0.7, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1). The sequence of rewards that the defender
would see against the second k-adaptive adversary A2 would be (0.19, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1).
It is easy to verify that this is the optimal result for the defender — if the defender
does not play HI on the first day then the 7-adaptive adversary will speed on day 2.
A k-adaptive regret minimization algorithm could be run without a priori knowledge
of the adversary’s utility, and will converge to the optimal fixed strategy against any
k-adaptive adversary (e.g., any sequence of k-adaptive tourist strategies).
Remark 1. A k-adaptive adversary is also an appropriate model for a temporary
employee at the hospital so we could also consider the interaction between a hos-
pital (defender) and a resident (adversary) at the hospital. The actions S and DS(e.g.,
“speed” and “don’t speed”) would be replaced with corresponding actions B and V
(e.g., “behave” and “violate”).
Unfortunateley, we are able to prove that there is no efficient k-adaptive regret min-
imization algorithm for general bounded memory games. However, our results do not
rule out the posibility of an efficient γ-approximate k-adaptive regret minimization al-
gorithm. Finding an efficient γ-approximate k-adaptive regret minimization algorithms
is an important open problem.
6 Hardness Results
In this section, we show that unless NP = RP no oblivious regret minimization al-
gorithm which uses the fixed strategies F as experts can be efficient in the imperfect
information setting. In Appendix A we explain how our hardness reduction can be ad-
apted to prove that there is no efficient k-adaptive regret minimization algorithm in the
perfect information setting for k ≥ 1.
Specifically, we consider the subclass of bounded-memory games G with the fol-
lowing properties: |O| = O(1), m = O (logn), |XA| = O(1), |XD| = O(1) and
imperfect information. Any G ∈ G is a game of imperfect information (on round t the
defender observes Ot, but not at) with O(n) states. Our goal is to prove the following
theorem:
Theorem 1. For any β > 0 and γ < 1/8nβ there is no efficient γ-approximate oblivi-
ous regret minimization algorithm which uses the fixed strategies F as experts against
oblivious adversaries for the class of imperfect information bounded-memory-mgames
unless NP = RP.
Given a slightly stronger complexity-theoretic assumption called the randomized
exponential time hypothesis [20] we can prove a slightly stronger hardness result. The
randomized exponential time hypothesis says that no randomized algorithm running in
time 2o(n) can solve SAT.
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Theorem 2. Assume that the randomized exponential time hypothesis is true. Then for
any γ < 1/
(
8 log2 n
)
there is no efficient γ-approximate oblivious regret minimization
algorithm which uses the fixed strategies F as experts against oblivious adversaries for
the class of imperfect information bounded-memory-m games.
The proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 use the fact that it is hard to approximate MAX3SAT
within any factor better than 78 [21]. This means that unless NP = RP then for every
constant β > 0 and every randomized algorithm S in RP , there exists a MAX3SAT
instance φ such that the expected number of clauses in φ unsatisfied by S(φ) is≥ 18−β
even though there exists an assignment satisfying (1− β) fraction of the clauses in φ.
We reduce a MAX3SAT formula φ with variables x1, ..., xn and clauses C1, ..., Cℓ
to a bounded-memory game G described formally below. We provide a high level
overview of the game G before describing the details. The main idea is to construct G
so that the rewards in G are related to the fraction of clauses of φ that are satisfied.
In G, for each variable x there is a state σx associated with that variable. The ob-
livious adversary controls the transitions between variables. This allows the oblivious
adversary AR to partition the game into stages of length n, such that during each stage
the adversary causes the game to visit each variable exactly once (each state is associ-
ated with a variable). During each stage the adversary picks a clause C at random. In
G we have 0, 1 ∈ XD. Intuitively, the defender chooses assignment x = 1 by playing
the action 1 while visiting the variable x. The defender receives a reward if and only if
he succeeds in satisfying the clause C.
The game G is defined as follows:
Defender Actions: XD = {0, 1, 2}
Adversary Actions: XA = {0, 1} × {0, 1, 2, 3}
Outcomes and States: Each round i produces two outcomes
O˜i = ~ai[1] and Oˆi =
{
1 if di = 2 or di = ai[2];
0 otherwise.
Observe that these outcomes satisfy the independent outcomes requirement for bounded-
memory games. There are n = 2m+1 states, where σi is the state at round i, where
σi =
(
〈O˜i−1, . . . , O˜i−m〉, Oˆi−1
)
.
Observe that each state encodes the last m outcomes O˜ and the last outcome Oˆi. Intu-
itively, the last m outcomes O˜i are used to denote the variable xi, while Oˆi is 1 if the
defender has already received a reward during the current phase.
The defender actions 0, 1 correspond to the truth assignments 0, 1. The defender
receives a reward for the correct assignment. The defender is punished if he attempts to
obtain a reward in any phase after he has already received a reward in that phase. Once
the defender has already received a reward he can play the special action 2 to avoid
getting punished. The intuitive meaning of the adversary’s actions is explained below.
If we ignore the outcome Oˆ then the states form a De Bruijn graph [22] where each
node corresponds to a variable of φ. Notice that the adversary completely controls the
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Figure 1: De Bruijn example
outcomes O˜ with the first component of his action ~a[1]. By playing a De Bruijn se-
quence S = s1...sn the adversary can guarantee that we repeatedly take a Hamiltonian
cycle over states(for an example see Figure 1).
Rewards:2
P
(
σi, di, ai
)
=


−1 if Oˆi−1 = 1 and di 6= 2 and ~ai[2] 6= 3;
1 if di 6= 2 and di = ~ai[2] and Oˆi−1 = 0;
0 otherwise.
An intuitive interpretation of the reward function is presented in parallel with the ad-
versary strategy.
Adversary Strategy: The first component of the adversary’s action (~a[1]) controls
the transitions between variables. The adversary will play the action ~ai[2] = 1 (resp.
~ai[2] = 0) whenever the corresponding variable assignment xi = 1 (resp. xi = 0)
satisfies the clause that the adversary chose for the current phase.
If neither variable assignment satisfies the clause (if xi /∈ C and x¯i /∈ C) then the
adversary plays ~ai[2] = 2. This ensures that a defender can only be rewarded during a
round if he satisfies the clause C, which happens when di = ~ai[2] = 0 or 1.
Notice that whenever Oˆ = 1 there is no way to receive a positive reward. The de-
fender may want the game G to return to a state where Oˆ = 0, but unless the adversary
plays the special action ~ai[2] = 3 he is penalized when this happens. The adversary
action ~ai[2] = 3 is a special ‘reset phase’ action. By playing ~ai[2] = 3 once at the end
of each phase the adversary can ensure that the maximum payoff the defender receives
during any phase is 1. See figure 2 for a formal description of the adversary strategy.
Analysis: At a high level, our hardness argument proceeds as follows:
1. If there is an assignment that satisfies (1 − β) fraction of the clauses in φ, then
there is a fixed strategy that performs well in expectation (see Claim 1).
2We use payoffs in the range [−1, 1] for ease of presentation. These payoffs can easily be re-scaled to lie
in [0, 1].
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• Input: MAX3SAT instance φ, with variables x1, . . . , xn−1 , and clauses C1, . . . , Cℓ.
Random string R ∈ {0, 1}∗
• De Bruijn sequence: s0, ..., sn−1
• Round t: Set i← t mod n.
1. Select Clause: If i = 0 then select a clause C uniformly at random from
C1, ..., Cℓ using R.
2. Select Move:
ai =


(si, 3) if i = 0;
(si, 1) if xi ∈ C;
(si, 0) if x¯i ∈ C;
(si, 2) otherwise.
Figure 2: Oblivious Adversary: AR
2. If there a fixed strategy that performs well in expectation, then any γ-approximate
oblivious regret minimization algorithm will perform well in expectation (see
Claim 2).
3. If an efficiently computable strategy D performs well in expectation, then there
is an efficiently computable randomized algorithm S to approximate MAX3SAT
(see Claim 3). This would imply that NP = RP.
Claim 1. Suppose that there is a variable assignment that satisfies (1− β) · ℓ of
the clauses in φ. Then there is a fixed strategy f such that ER
[
P¯ (f,AR, G, n)
] ≥
(1− β) /n , where R is used to denote the random coin tosses of the oblivious ad-
versary.
Claim 2. Suppose that D is an
(
1
8n − 3βn
)
-approximate oblivious regret minimization
algorithm against the class of oblivious adversaries and there is a variable assignment
that satisfies (1 − β) fraction of the clauses in φ. Then for T = poly(n)
ER
[
P¯ (D,AR, G, T )
] ≥ 7
8n
+
β
n
,
where R is used to denote the random coin tosses of the oblivious adversary.
Claim 3. Fix a polynomial p(·) and let α = n · ER
[
P¯ (D,AR, G, T )
]
, where T =
p(n) and D is any polynomial time computable strategy. There is a polynomial time
randomized algorithm S which satisfies α fraction of the clauses from φ in expectation.
The proofs of these claims can be found in Appendix A.
Proof of Theorem 1. The key point is that if an algorithm S runs in time O (p(n))
on instances of size nβ for some polynomial p(n) then on instances of size n S runs
in time O
(
p
(
n1/β
))
which is still polynomial time. Unless NP = RP ∀ǫ, β > 0 and
every algorithm S running in time poly(n), there exists an integer n and a MAX3SAT
formula φ with nβ variables such that
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1. There is an assignment satisfying at least (1− ǫ) of the clauses in φ.
2. The expected fraction of clauses in φ satisfied by S is ≤ 78 + ǫ.
If we reduce from a MAX3SAT instance with nβ variables we can construct a game
with O(n) states (n1−β copies of each variable). One Hamiltonian cycle would now
corresponds to n1−β phases of the game. This means that the expected average reward
of the optimal fixed strategy is at least
max
f∈F
ER
[
P¯ (f,AR, G, T )
] ≥ n1−β (1− ǫ)
n
,
while the expected average reward of an efficient defender strategy D is at most
ER
[
P¯ (D,AR, G, T )
] ≤ n1−β
(
7
8 + ǫ
)
n
.
Therefore, the expected average regret is at least
R¯0 (D,AR, G, T, F ) ≥
(
1
8
− 2ǫ
)
n−β .

The proof of theorem 2 is similar to the proof of theorem 1. It can be found in
Appendix A.
Our hardness reduction is similar to a result from Even-Dar, et al., [11]. They con-
sider regret minimization in a Markov Decision Process where the adversary controls
the transition model. Their game is not a bounded-memory game; in particular it does
not satisfy our independent outcomes condition. The current state in their game can
depend on the last n actions. In contrast, we consider bounded-memory games with
m = O (logn), so that the current state only depends on the last m actions. This makes
it much more challenging to enforce guarantees such as “the defender can only receive
a reward once in each window of n rounds”—a property that is used in the hardness
proof. The adversary is oblivious so she will not remember this fact, and the game
itself cannot record whether a reward was given m+ 1 rounds ago. We circumvented
this problem by designing a payoff function in which the defender is penalized for al-
lowing the game to “forget” when the last reward was given, thus effectively enforcing
the desired property.
7 Regret Minimization Algorithms
In section 7.1 we present a reduction from bounded-memory games to repeated games.
This reduction can be used to create a k-adaptive regret minimizing algorithm (The-
orem 3). This is significant because there is no k-adaptive regret minimization al-
gorithm for the general class of stochastic games. A consequence of Theorem 1 is that
when the expert set includes all fixed strategies F we cannot hope for an efficient al-
gorithm unless NP = RP. In section 7.2 we present an efficient approximate 0-adaptive
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regret minimization algorithm for bounded-memory games of perfect information. The
algorithm uses an implicit weight representation to efficiently sample the experts and
update their weights. Finaly, we show how this algorithm can be adapted to obtain an
efficient approximate 0-adaptive regret minimization algorithm for bounded-memory
games of imperfect information.
7.1 Reduction to Repeated Games
All of our regret minimization algorithms work by first reducing the bounded-memory
game G to a repeated game ρ (G,K). One round of the repeated game ρ (G,K) cor-
responds to K rounds of G. Before each round of ρ (G,K) both players commit
to an adaptive strategy. In ρ (G,K) the reward that the defender gets for playing a
strategy f ∈ AKD is the reward that the defender would have received for using the
strategy f for the next K rounds of the actual game G if the initial state were σ0:
P (f, g, ρ (G,K)) = P (f, g,G, σ0,K).
The rewards in ρ (G,K) may be different from the actual rewards in G because
the initial state before each K rounds might not be σ0. Claim 4 bounds the differ-
ence between the hypothetical losses from ρ (G,K) and actual losses in G using the
bounded-memory property. The proof of Claim 4 is in Appendix B.
Claim 4. For any adaptive defender strategy f ∈ AKD and any adaptive adversary
strategy g ∈ AKA and any state σ ofGwe have |P (f, g,G, σ,K)− P (f, g,G, σ0,K)| ≤
m .
The key idea behind our k-adaptive regret minimization algorithm BW is to reduce
the original bounded-memory game to a repeated game ρ (G,K) of imperfect inform-
ation (K ≡ 0 mod k). In particular we obtain the regret bound in Theorem 3. Details
and proofs can be found in Appendix B.
Theorem 3. Let G be any bounded-memory-m game with n states and let A be any
adversary strategy. After playing T rounds of G againstA, BW (G,K) achieves regret
bound
R¯k (BW, A,G, T, S) <
m
T 1/4
+ 4
√
N logN
T 1/4
,
where N = |S| is the number of experts, A is the adversary strategy and K has been
chosen so that K = T 1/4 and K ≡ 0 mod k.
Intuitively, the m/T 1/4 = m/K term is due to modeling loss from Claim 4 and
the other term comes from the standard regret bound of [23].
7.2 Efficient Approximate Regret Minimization Algorithms
In this section we present EXBW (Efficient approXimate Bounded Memory Weighted
Majority), an efficient algorithm to approximately minimize regret against an oblivious
adversary in bounded-memory games with perfect information. The set of experts
E used by our algorithms contains the fixed strategies F as well as all K-adaptive
strategies AKD (K = m/γ). We prove the following theorem
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Theorem 4. Let G be any bounded-memory-m game of perfect information with n
states and let A be any adversary strategy. Playing T rounds of G against A, EXBW
runs in total time TnO(1/γ) and achieves regret bound
R¯0 (EXBW, A,G, T, E) ≤ γ +O

m
γ
√
m
γ n log (N)
T

 ,
where K has been set to m/γ and N =
∣∣AKD ∣∣ = (|XD|)n1/γ is the number of K-
adaptive strategies.
In particular, for any constant γ there is an efficient γ-approximate 0-adaptive re-
gret minimization algorithm for bounded-memory games of perfect information. We
can adapt this algorithm to get EXBWII (Efficient approXimate Bounded Memory
Weighted Majority for Imperfect Information Games), an efficient approximate 0-
adaptive regret minimization algorithm for games of imperfect information using a
sampling strategy described in Appendix B.
Theorem 5. Let G be any bounded-memory-m game of imperfect information with n
states and let A be any adversary strategy. There is an algorithm EXBWII that runs in
total time TnO(1/γ) playing T rounds of G against A, and achieves regret bound
R¯0 (EXBWII, A,G, T, E) ≤ 2γ +O

mn1/γ
γ2
√
mn1/γ
γ n log (N)
T

 .
where K has been set to m/γ and N =
∣∣AKD ∣∣ = (|XD|)n1/γ is the number of K-
adaptive strategies.
The regret bound of Theorem 4 is simply the regret bound achieved by the stand-
ard weighted majority algorithm [24] plus the modeling loss term from Claim 4. The
main challenge is to provide an efficient simulation of the weighted majority algorithm.
There are an exponential number of experts so no efficient algorithm can explicitly
maintain weights for each of these experts. To simulate the weighted majority al-
gorithm EXBW implicitly maintains the weight of each expert.
To simulate the weighted majority algorithm we must be able to efficiently sample
from our weighted set of experts (see Sample (E)) and efficiently update the weights
of each expert in the set after each round of ρ (G,K) (see update weight stage of
EXBW).
Meet the Experts Instead of using F as the set of experts, EXBW uses a larger set
of experts E (F ⊂ E). Recall that a K-adaptive strategy is a function f mapping
the K most recent outcomes HK to actions. We use a set of K-adaptive strategies
E = {fσ : σ ∈ Σ} ⊂ AKD to define an expert E in ρ (G,K): if the current state of the
real bounded-memory game G is σ then E uses the K-adaptive strategy fσ in the next
round of ρ (G,K) (i.e., the next K rounds of G). E denotes the set of all such experts.
Maintaining Weights for Experts Implicitly To implicitly maintain the weights of
each expert E ∈ E we use the concept of a game trace. We say that a game trace
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p = σ, d1, O1, ..., di−1, Oi−1, di is consistent with an expert E if fσ
(
O1, ..., Oj−1
)
=
dj for each j. We define the set C (E) to be the set of all such consistent traces of
maximum length K and C = ⋃E∈E C (E) denotes the set of all traces consistent with
some expert E ∈ E . EXBW maintains a weight wp on each trace p ∈ C. The weight of
an expert E is then defined to be WE =
∏
p∈C(E)wp.
Given adversary actions~a = a1, ..., aK and a trace p = σ, d1, O1, ..., di−1, Oi−1, di
we define R (~a, σ′, p).
R (~a, σ′, p) =
{
0 if σ 6= σ′;∏
j<i Pr
[
Oj aj , dj
]
otherwise;
Intuitively, R (~a, σ′, p)
is the probability that
each outcome of pwould
have occurred given the
adversary actions were ~a and the initial state was σ′. We use ℓ (p,~a, σ′) to denote
the payment that the defender received for playing di (the last action in p). Formally
ℓ (p,~a, σ′) = P
(
σfp , d
i, ai
)R (~a, σ′, p), where σfp denotes the state reached follow-
ing the trace p (after observing outcomes O1, ..., Oi−1 starting from σ0) and di is the
final defender action in the trace. Notice that in the imperfect information setting the
defender could not compute ℓ because he would not observe the adversary’s actions ~a.
Updating Weights Efficiently While updating weights EXBW maintains the invariant
thatwp = β
∑T/K
j=1 ℓ(p,~a
j ,σjK)
, where σjK is the state ofG after jK rounds and ~at is the
actions the adversary played during the j’th round of ρ (G,K). The standard weighted
majority algorithm maintains the invariant that WE = β
∑T/K
j=1 P(E,~a
t,ρ(G,K))
. Claim 5
implies that EXBW also maintains this invariant with its implicit weight representation
— the proof of Claim 5 is in Appendix B.
Claim 5. ∏
p∈C(E)
β
∑T/K
j=1 ℓ(p,~a
j ,σjK) = β
∑T/K
j=1 P(E,~a
j,ρ(G,K)) .
Sampling Experts Efficiently We can also efficiently sample from E using dynamic
programming (see Sample (E)). Using the notation p ⊏ p′ for p′ extends p we can
define wˆp. Intuitively, wˆp;O;d represents the weight of the action d from history p;O.
wˆp =
∑
E:p∈C(E)
∏
p′∈C(E)∧p⊏p′
wp′
Using dynamic programming we can efficiently
compute wˆp for each trace p because there are
only nO(1/γ) such traces. Using the weights wˆp
we can efficiently sample from E . We use p;O; d
to denote a new game trace which contains all of the outcomes/actions in p appended
with O and d.
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Algorithm: EXBW (γ,G)
• Initialize: K = m/γ
• Construct: ρ (G,K)
• Each Round:
1. σ ← G.CurrentState
2. E ← Sample (E)
3. Play E
4. Observe adversary actions
~a = a1, ..., aK .
5. Update Weights: For each p ∈
C
A. Compute ℓ (p,~a, σ)
B. Set wp ← wp × βℓ(p,~a,σ).
Algorithm: Sample (E)
• For each trace p ∈ C recursively compute
wˆp using the formula:
wˆp =
∑
O∈O
∑
d∈XD
β
∑T
t=1 ℓ(p;O;d,~a
t,σKt)wˆp;O;d .
• Build Strategy E: For each p ∈ C and O ∈
O, randomly select d ∈ XD
Pr [d p, O] =
wˆp;O;d∑
d′∈XD wˆp;O;d′
.
• E play d any time it observes history p;O.
Claim 6 says that Sample (E) outputs each expertE with probability proportional
to WE .
Claim 6. For each expert E ∈ E Algorithm Sample (E) outputs E with probability
Pr [E] ∝WE .
Given Sample (E) it is straightforward to simulate the standard weighted majority
algorithm. To update weights EXBW simply loops through all traces p ∈ C applying
the update rule wp = wp× βℓ(p,~a
t,σtK)
, where β is a learning parameter we tune later.
The formal proof of Theorem 4 can be found in Appendix B along with the proof of
claim 6.
At a high level our algorithm is similar to the online shortest path algorithm de-
veloped by Takimoto and Warmuth [14]. In their work, they consider the set of all
source-destination paths in a graph as experts. Since there are exponentially many
paths they also maintain the weights of the experts implicitly. In their setting, the de-
fender completely controls the chosen path. In contrast, our experts adapt to adversary
actions. The challenge was constructing a new implicit weight representation which
works for K-adaptive strategies.
Using this implicit weight representation we could have also used the general bary-
centric spanner approach to online linear optimization developed by Awerbuch and
Kleinberg [15] to design a γ-approximate 0-adaptive regret minimization algorithm
running in time nO(1/γ). However, we are able to achieve better regret bounds in the-
orem 4 by simulating the weighted majority algorithm. Awerbuch and Kleinberg [15,
Theorem 2.8] achieve the average regret bound O
(
Md5/3/T 1/3
)
, where d is the di-
mension of the problem space and M is a bound on the cost vectors. By comparison
our regret bounds in Theorems 4 and 5 tend to 0 with 1/
√
T . In our setting, the di-
mension of the problem space is d = O
(
n(1/γ)
) (the number of nodes in the decision
tree), and M = K = m/γ is the upper bound on the cost vector in each round of
ρ (G,K). The average regret bound would be O
(
m
γ n
5/(3γ)/T 1/3
)
. the regret bound
is proportional to
√
n1/γ/T . By comparison Theorem 4 has a
√
n1/γ in the numerator.
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The standard regret minimization trick for dealing with imperfect information in
a repeated game is to break the game up into phases and perform random sampling
in each round to estimate the cost of each expert and update weights. The challenge
in adapting EXBW is that there are exponentially many experts in E . Our key idea
was to estimate ℓ (p,~a, σ) for each p ∈ C so there are only nO(1/γ) samples to take in
each phase. We can then update the implicit weight representation using the estimated
values ℓ (p,~a, σ).
8 Open Questions
In this paper, we defined a new class of games called bounded-memory games, in-
troduced several new notions of regret, and presented hardness results and algorithms
for regret minimization in this subclass of stochastic games. Because both the games
and the notions of regret we study in this paper rely on novel definitions, they raise a
number of interesting open problems: (1) To what extent can the hardness results of
Theorems 1 and 2 be further improved? (γ = 1/logn?) Could similar hardness res-
ults apply to games with perfect information? (2) Is there an efficient non-approximate
oblivious regret minimization algorithm for bounded-memory games with perfect in-
formation? (3) Is there a γ-approximate oblivious regret minimization algorithm with
running time no(1/γ)? For example, could one design a γ-approximate oblivious regret
minimization algorithm with running time n− log γ? (4) For repeated games (m = 0)
is there an efficient γ-approximate k-adaptive regret minimization algorithm if we use
AKD as our set of experts (K = logn)?
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A Hardness Reduction: Proof of Claims
This section contains the proofs of the lemmas and theorems from section 6.
Reminder of Claim 1. Suppose that there is a variable assignment that satisfies
(1− β)·ℓ of the clauses in φ. Then there is a fixed strategy f such thatER
[
P¯ (f,AR, G, n)
] ≥
(1− β) /n , where R is used to denote the random coin tosses of the oblivious ad-
versary.
Proof of Claim 1. Let x1∗, ..., xn−1∗ be the assignment that satisfies at least (1 − β)
fraction of the clauses and let s0, ..., sn−1 be the De Bruijn sequence played by the
adversary. xn is an additional variable that is not in any of the clauses. Then the on
round t we have
σt =
(
〈si−1 mod n, ..., si−m mod n〉, Oˆt−1
)
,
where i = t mod n so both these states are associated with the variable xi. For
0 ≤ i < n we set
f (〈si−1 mod n, ..., si−m mod n〉, 0) = xi ∗ .
To avoid taking a penalty we set
f (〈si−1 mod n, ..., si−m mod n〉, 1) = 2 ,
for 0 < i < n. For i = 0 we set
f (〈si−1 mod n, ..., si−m mod n〉, 1) = 0 ,
to produce the outcome Oˆt = 0 (recall that the adversary will play at = (s0, 3)
whenever t ≡ 0 mod n so we can avoid the penalty). The fixed strategy f will receive
reward 1 in stage j if and only if x1∗, ..., xn−1∗ satisfies the clause Cj chosen in stage
j.
ER
[
P¯ (f,AR, G, n)
] ≥ (1 − β)
n
(1)

Reminder of Claim 2. Suppose that D is an
(
1
8n − 3βn
)
-approximate oblivious
regret minimization algorithm against the class of oblivious adversaries and there is
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a variable assignment that satisfies (1 − β) fraction of the clauses in φ. Then for
T = poly(n)
ER
[
P¯ (D,AR, G, T )
] ≥ 7
8n
+
β
n
,
where R is used to denote the random coin tosses of the oblivious adversary.
Proof of Claim 2. By Claim 1 there is a fixed strategy with
ER
[
P¯ (D,AR, G, T )
] ≥ (1− β)
n
.
Set ǫ = β/n, and apply definition 1 to get
P¯ (f,AR, G, T )− P¯ (D,AR, G, T ) ≤
(
1
8n
− 3β
n
)
+ β/n ,
for any random string R (adversary coin flips). This means that
ER
[
P¯ (f,AR, G, T )
]− ER [P¯ (D,AR, G, T )] ≤
(
1
8n
− 3β
n
)
+
β
n
.
Rearranging terms
ER
[
P¯ (D,AR, G, T )
] ≥ (1− β)
n
− 1
8n
+
2β
n
=
7
8n
+
β
n

Reminder of Claim 3. Fix a polynomial p(·) and let α = n · ER
[
P¯ (D,AR, G, T )
]
, where T = p(n) and D is any polynomial time computable strategy. There is a
polynomial time randomized algorithm S which satisfies α fraction of the clauses from
φ in expectation.
Proof of Claim 3. Let p(◦) be given such that T (D) ≤ p(n) and set
α = n× ER
[
P¯ (D,AR, G, T )
]
.
We present S ( Algorithm 1) - an algorithm to recover the variable assignment. S
runs in time
T (S) = O
(
p(n)2
)
.
During the simulation we present D with (potentially) false history in each stage,
where the defender always thinks he hasn’t satisfied the clause C. Let Yj be the
expected fraction of clauses satisfied in stage j of the simulation. We define the random
variable Xj to be the reward D earns in stage j in the actual game. Observe that the
game is structured so that two rewards during the same stage must be separated by
a penalty. When the defender receives a reward the outcome Oˆt−1 is produced. If
the defender wishes to avoid an offsetting penalty then he must keep producing the
outcome Oˆt−1 by playing dt = 2, preventing him from receiving an award for the rest
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of the stage. The maximum payout a defender strategy D can receive during any stage
is 1 so Xj ∈ {0, 1}. Because of imperfect information the defender cannot learn any
information about the clause the adversary has selected. We have
E[Xj ] = Pr[Xj = 1] = E[Yj ] .
In particular
α =
n
T
T/n∑
j=1
E[Yj ] ,
so there exists a round j such that E[Yj ] ≥ α. Let Y denote the number of clauses
satisfied by S, then
Y = max
j
Yj ,
so we have
E[Y] ≥ α .

Before we prove Theorem 1 we will first prove an easier Lemma using these claims.
The proof of Lemma 1 can be easily adapted to prove Theorems 1 and 2.
Lemma 1. Unless NP = RP, for γ < 1/8n there is no efficient γ-approximate oblivi-
ous regret minimization algorithm which uses the fixed strategies F as experts against
oblivious adversaries for bounded-memory-m games of imperfect information.
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose that D were an efficient γ-approximate oblivious regret
minimization algorithm and consider the polynomial time randomized algorithm S.
Combining Claim 2 and Claim 3, for every MAX3SAT formula φ with ≥ (1 − β)
fraction of the clauses satisfiable S satisfies ≥ 78 + β fraction of the clauses from φ in
expectation. This would imply that NP = RP [21]. 
The proof of Theorem 1 is very similar to the proof of Lemma 1.
Reminder of Theorem 1. For any β > 0 and γ < 1/8nβ there is no efficient γ-
approximate oblivious regret minimization algorithm which uses the fixed strategies F
as experts against oblivious adversaries for the class of imperfect information bounded-
memory-m games unless NP = RP.
Proof of Theorem 1. The key point is that if an algorithm S runs in time O (p(n))
on instances of size nβ for some polynomial p(n) then on instances of size n S runs
in time O
(
p
(
n1/β
))
which is still polynomial time. Unless NP = RP ∀ǫ, β > 0 and
every algorithm S running in time poly(n), there exists an integer n and a MAX3SAT
formula φ with nβ variables such that
1. There is an assignment satisfying at least (1− ǫ) of the clauses in φ.
2. The expected fraction of clauses in φ satisfied by S is ≤ 78 + ǫ.
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If we reduce from a MAX3SAT instance with nβ variables we can construct a game
with O(n) states (n1−β copies of each variable). One Hamiltonian cycle would now
corresponds to n1−β phases of the game. This means that the expected average reward
of the optimal fixed strategy is at least
max
f∈F
ER
[
P¯ (f,AR, G, T )
] ≥ n1−β (1− ǫ)
n
,
while the expected average reward of an efficient defender strategy D is at most
ER
[
P¯ (D,AR, G, T )
] ≤ n1−β
(
7
8 + ǫ
)
n
.
Therefore, the expected average regret is at least
R¯0 (D,AR, G, T, F ) ≥
(
1
8
− 2ǫ
)
n−β .

While the proof of Theorem 2 makes use of the randomized exponential time hy-
pothesis the argument is similar to the proof of Theorem 1.
Reminder of Theorem 2. Assume that the randomized exponential time hypothesis
is true. Then for any γ < 1/ (8 log2 n) there is no efficient γ-approximate oblivious
regret minimization algorithm which uses the fixed strategies F as experts against ob-
livious adversaries for the class of imperfect information bounded-memory-m games.
Proof of Theorem 2. (sketch) Assume that the randomized exponential time hypo-
thesis holds. Then because it is NP-hard to approximate MAX3SAT within any factor
better than 78 [21] no randomized algorithm which satisfies ≥ 78 + ǫ of the clauses in a
MAX3SAT instance in expectation can run in time
2o(n) .
Now we argue that it is sufficient to reduce from a MAX3SAT instance with n′ =
log2 n variables (instead of nβ variables). One Hamiltonian cycle now corresponds to
n
log2 n
,
phases of the game. Our bounded-memory game G has n states then any efficient
γ-approximate regret minimization algorithm S must run in time O
(
nk
)
for some
constant k. If the randomized exponential time hypothesis holds then the expected
average reward of an efficient defender strategy D is at most
ER
[
P¯ (D,AR, G, T )
] ≤ nlog2 n
(
7
8 + ǫ
)
n
,
since
nc = 2k
√
log2 n = 2k
√
n′ = 2o(n
′) .
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However, if the MAX3SAT formula was satisfiable then the expected average re-
ward of the optimal fixed strategy is at least
max
f∈F
ER
[
P¯ (f,AR, G, T )
] ≥ nlog2 n (1− ǫ)
n
=
1− ǫ
log2 n
.
Therefore, the expected average regret is at least
R¯0 (D,AR, G, T, F ) ≥
(
1
8 − 2ǫ
)
log2 n
.
Assume for contradiction that γ < 1
8 log2 n
then S can be adapted to satisfy≥ 78 + ǫ
of the clauses in MAX3SAT with running time
nc = 2k
√
log2 n = 2k
√
n′ = 2o(n
′) .
This contradicts the randomized exponential time hypothesis.

Remark 2 shows how our hardness reduction can be adapted to prove that there is
no efficient k-adaptive regret minimization algorithm in the perfect information setting
k ≥ 1.
Remark 2. In bounded-memory games of perfect information we can replace the ob-
livious adversary AR in figure 2 with a 1-adaptive adversary and essentially the same
reduction will still work. We only need to make a few small modifications. The states of
the game will be modified to store the defenders last action. The adversary again plays
a Hamiltonian cycle through the states in each phase. Now the first two states we visit
correspond to the variable x1, the next two visited states will correspond to x2, etc. If
the defender plays actions 1 and 1 (resp. 0 and 0) while visiting the variable x1 then
this corresponds to assigning x1 to true (resp. false). If the defender plays 1 and 0 (or
0 and 1) which corresponds to no assignment then the adversary strategy will ensure
that he cannot receive a reward.
The 1-adaptive adversary will always play ~at[2] = 2 on even rounds (t = 0
mod 2) and on odd rounds the adversary will adaptively select ~at[2] = dt−1 if the
defender’s last action satisfied the chosen clause C, otherwise ~at[2] = 2. The defender
receives a reward only if (1) he plays a consistent assignment during both rounds (2)
the assignment satisfies the chosen clause C and (3) he has not already received a
reward during this phase. Now Claim 3 still holds because a defender will always
observe the adversary action ~at[2] = 2 until he satisfied the clause C.
A.1 Transition Example
By playing a De Bruijn sequence S = s1...sn the adversary can guarantee that we
repeatedly take a Hamiltonian cycle over states. For example, considering 8 states
and starting from x0, the sequence 10111000 corresponds to the Hamiltonian cycle
x0, x1, x2, x5, x3, x7, x6, x4
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Figure 3: De Bruijn example
B Regret Minimization Algorithms
B.1 Regret Minimization Algorithm with Imperfect Information
We present BW (Bounded Memory Weighted Majority), an algorithm that minim-
izes k-adaptive regret for bounded-memory games. This result is significant because
there is no k-adaptive regret minimization algorithm for the general class of stochastic
games(see Theorem 6 in Appendix C). A consequence of Theorem 1 is that when the
expert set includes all fixed strategies F we cannot hope for an efficient algorithm
unless NP = RP. Indeed, our algorithm would not be efficient in this case because
it would have to explicitly maintains weights for exponentially many fixed strategies
|F | = |XD|n.
The key idea behind our k-adaptive regret minimization algorithm BW is to reduce
the original bounded-memory game to a repeated game ρ (G,K) of imperfect inform-
ation (K ≡ 0 mod k). BW uses the Exp3 regret minimization algorithm of [23] for
repeated games of imperfect information. In particular, BW uses the strategies selected
by Exp3 in each round of ρ (G,K) to play the next K rounds of G. BW feeds Exp3
the hypothetical losses from ρ (G,K) to update the weights of each expert.
Reminder of Theorem 3. Let G be any bounded-memory-m game with n states and
let A be any adversary strategy. After playing T rounds of G against A, BW (G,K)
achieves regret bound
R¯k (BW, A,G, T, S) <
m
T 1/4
+ 4
√
N logN
T 1/4
,
where N = |S| is the number of experts, A is the adversary strategy and K has been
chosen so that K = T 1/4 and K ≡ 0 mod k.
Proof of Theorem 3. (Sketch) The proof of theorem uses standard regret bound for
regret minimization algorithms in games of perfect information [23]. After playing T
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rounds (T/K rounds of ρ (G,K)) we have
P¯ (D,Ak, ρ (G,K) , T/K)− P¯ (f,Ak, ρ (G,K) , T/K) ≥ −4
√
KN logN
T/K
,
for all fixed strategies f ∈ F . Here, N is the number of experts
N = |F | = |XD||Σ| ,
and K also denotes the maximum payout in any round of ρ (G,K).Because K was
chosen such that K ≡ 0 mod k the adversary Ak is always in phase with ρ (G,K)
and we can apply Claim 4 to get Theorem 3. 
In particular, BW is a k-adaptive regret minimization algorithm for the class of
bounded-memory games in the sense of Definition 1 because R¯k → 0 as T →∞.
Remark 3. BW is inefficient when number of experts f ∈ S is exponential in n, the
number of states in G. For example, if S = F then |F | = |XD|n. For small values of n
(example: for repeated games n = 1) it will still be tractable to run BW with S = F .
B.2 Proofs of Claims and Theorems
This section contains the proof of claims and theorems from section 7.
Claim 4 bounds the difference between the hypothetical losses from ρ (G,K) and
actual losses in G using the bounded-memory property.
Reminder of Claim 4. For any adaptive defender strategy f ∈ AKD and any adaptive
adversary strategy g ∈ AKA and any state σ ofGwe have |P (f, g,G, σ,K)− P (f, g,G, σ0,K)| ≤
m .
Proof of Claim 4. (Sketch) Once the defender selects f and the adversary selects
strategy g ∈ K−ADAPTA, the actions of the adversary and the defender are fixed for
the nextK rounds ofG. Let d1, ..., dK (resp. a1, ..., aK) denote the actions taken by the
defender (resp. adversary). Once R1, ..., RK (the random coins used by the outcome
function) are fixed then the outcomes O1, ..., OK are also fixed. Let σ1, ..., σK states
encountered in the actual game and let σ1∗ , ..., σK∗ be the states that we would have
encountered if we had started at σ0 as in ρ (G,K). In a bounded-memory property
game the state encodes the last m outcomes, but the outcomes do not depend on the
starting state so we have
σj = σj∗ ,
for all j ≥ m. This means that for j ≥ m
P
(
σj , dj , aj
)
= P
(
σj∗, d
j , aj
)
.
Consequently,
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|P (f, g, σ,G)− P (f, g, σ0, G)| =
∣∣∣∣∣
k∑
t=1
P
(
dt, at, σ
i
)− k∑
t=1
P
(
dt, at, σ
i
∗
)∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
m−1∑
t=1
P
(
dt, at, σ
i
)− P (dt, at, σi∗)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ m .

The standard weighted majority algorithm maintains the invariant thatWE = β
∑T/K
j=1 P(E,~a
t,ρ(G,K))
.
Claim 5 says that EXBW also maintains this invariant.
Reminder of Claim 5.∏
p∈C(E)
β
∑T/K
j=1 ℓ(p,~a
j ,σjK) = β
∑T/K
j=1 P(E,~a
j,ρ(G,K)) .
Proof of Claim 5. First notice that we can write
T/K∑
j=1
P
(
E,~aj , ρ (G,K)
)
=
∑
p∈C(E)
T/K∑
j=1
ℓ
(
p,~aj , σjK
)
,
since the overall payoff of an expert E can be expressed as a sum of the individual
immediate payoffs after each action.
∏
p∈C(E)
β
∑T/K
j=1 ℓ(p,~a
j ,σjK) = β
∑
p∈C(E)
∑T/K
j=1 ℓ(p,~a
j ,σjK)
= β
∑T/K
t=1 P(E,~a
t,ρ(G,K)) .

Claim 6 says that Sample (E) samples from the right distribution.
Reminder of Claim 6. For each expert E ∈ E Algorithm Sample (E) outputs E
with probability
Pr [E] ∝WE .
Proof. Given a trace p = p0;O; d let Chosen (p0;O) be the event that the strategy
output by Algorithm Sample (E) plays d from given history p0;O.
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Pr [Output E] =
∏
p∈C,O∈O
Pr [Chosen (p;O) = E (p;O)]
=
∏
p∈C,O∈O,d=E(p,O)
wˆp;O;d∑
d′∈XD wˆp;O;d′
=
∏
p∈C,O∈O,d=E(p,O)
∑
E′:(p;O;d)∈C(E′)
∏
p′∈C(E′)∧p;O;d⊏p′ wp′∑
d′∈XD
∑
E′:(p;O;d′)∈C(E′)
∏
p′∈C(E′)∧p;O;d′⊏p′ wp′
=
∏
p∈C,O∈O,d=E(p,O)
∑
E′:(p;O;d)∈C(E′)
∏
p′∈C(E′)∧p;O;d⊏p′ wp′∑
d′∈XD
∑
E′:(p;O;d′)∈C(E′)
∏
p′∈C(E′)∧p;O;d′⊏p′ wp′
×
∏
p′⊏p wp′∏
p′⊏p wp′
=
∏
p∈C,O∈O,d=E(p,O)
∑
E′:(p;O;d)∈C(E′)
∏
p′∈C(E′) wp′∑
d′∈XD
∑
E′:(p;O;d′)∈C(E′)
∏
p′∈C(E′) wp′
=
∏
p∈C,O∈O,d=E(p,O)
∑
E′:(p;O;d)∈C(E′)WE′∑
d′∈XD
∑
E′:(p;O;d′)∈C(E′)WE′
=
∏
p∈C,O∈O,d=E(p,O)
∑
E′:(p;O;d)∈C(E′)WE′∑
E′∈EWE′
=
WE∑
E′∈EWE′
.
Reminder of Theorem 4. Let G be any bounded-memory-m game of perfect inform-
ation with n states and let A be any adversary strategy. Playing T rounds of G against
A, EXBW runs in total time TnO(1/γ) and achieves regret bound
R¯0 (EXBW, A,G, T, E) ≤ γ +O

m
γ
√
m
γ n log (N)
T

 ,
where K has been set to m/γ and N =
∣∣AKD ∣∣ = (|XD|)n1/γ is the number of K-
adaptive strategies.
Proof of Theorem 4. By Claims 5 and 6 Algorithm EXBW perfectly simulates the
weighted majority algorithm [24]. Notice that there are Nn experts in E and we are
playing T/K rounds of ρ (G,K). The maximum payment in round of ρ (G,K) is
K = m/γ. The regret bound immediately follows from Claim 4 (the γ = m/K term)
and the standard regret bound from [24] after setting
β = min{1
2
,
√
n ln (N)
T
} .
The regret bound holds against all experts E ∈ E so in particular the regret bound
also holds against all fixed experts f ∈ F since F ⊂ E .
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The running time of EXBW is proportional to the number of traces in C. There are
only nO(1/γ) total traces in C so for any constant γ the running time is polynomial. 
Reminder of Theorem 5. Let G be any bounded-memory-m game with n states and
let A be any adversary strategy. After playing T rounds of G against A, BW (G,K)
achieves regret bound
R¯k (BW, A,G, T, S) <
m
T 1/4
+ 4
√
N logN
T 1/4
,
where N = |S| is the number of experts, A is the adversary strategy and K has been
chosen so that K = T 1/4 and K ≡ 0 mod k.
Proof of Theorem 5. (Sketch) We group the rounds of ρ (G,K) into phases of n1/γγ
rounds. Each phase now corresponds to
K
n1/γ
γ
=
mn1/γ
γ2
,
rounds of G. As before there are Nn experts.
Within a single phase let ~ai
(
i = 1, ..., n1/γ/γ
)
denote the actions of the adversary
during round i of that phase. To update our implicit weight representation we would
like to compute ∑
i
ℓ
(
p,~ai, σ
)
,
for each p ∈ C. However, we do not know the adversary actions ~ai in each phase.
Instead of computing ∑
i
ℓ
(
p,~ai, σ
)
,
we will estimate this quantity. For each
~d ∈ X
m
γ
D ,
we will play the defender actions ~d in a randomly chosen round of the phase. Let ~O
and ~ℓ =
(
ℓ1, ..., ℓm/γ
)
denote the observed outcomes and payoffs in this round and let
pj be the path corresponding to the first j defender actions from ~d and outcomes from
~O. For each path pj we set
ℓ′
(
pj , σ
)
=
n1/γ
γ
ℓj .
If the path p never occured during a sampling round of the phase then we set
ℓ′
(
pj, σ
)
= 0 .
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For each path p ∈ C we have
E [ℓ′ (p, σ)] =
n1/γ
γ
E [ℓi]
=
n1/γ
γ
∑
i
γ
n1/γ
ℓ
(
p,~ai, σ
)
=
∑
i
ℓ
(
p,~ai, σ
)
where the expectation is taken over the random selection of sampling rounds. Now we
can use the estimated losses ℓ′ to maintain our implicit weight representation.
The following factors explain why the final regret bound is slightly worse than the
bound in the perfect information setting (Theorem 4):
1. We spend at most ∣∣∣X mγD ∣∣∣ ≤ n1/γ ,
rounds of each phase sampling. There are n1/γγ rounds in a phase so the average
sampling loss per round is at most
n1/γ(
n1/γ
γ
) = γ .
This is in addition to modeling loss (γ) from claim 4. In the perfect information
setting there is no sampling loss just the modeling loss.
2. We are only now only updating weights after each phase. If T is the number
of rounds of the bounded-memory game G that we play then we only update
weights T ′ times where
T ′ =
Tγ2
mn1/γ
.
In the perfect information setting we had T ′ = Tγm .
3. The maximum loss in each phase is now the length of a phase
m
γ
(
n1/γ
γ
)
,
instead of the length of a round m/γ.

Remark 4. Because repeated games are a subset of bounded-memory games, EXBW
(resp. EXBWII) could also be used to minimize oblivious regret in a repeated game
of perfect information (resp. imperfect information) using AKD as experts. In this case
there is no modeling loss from claim 4 so the guarantee is that we perform as well
as the best K-adaptive defender strategy in hindsight. As long as K = O (logn) the
running time of our algorithms will be time polynomial in n.
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C Impossibility of Regret Minimization in Stochastic
Games
Stochastic Games Stochastic games are a generalization of repeated games, in which
the payoffs depend on the state of play. Formally, a two-player stochastic game between
an attacker A and a defender D is given by (XD,XA,Σ, P, τ), where XA and XD
are the actions spaces for players A and D, respectively, Σ is the state space, P :
Σ×XD ×XA → [0, 1] is the payoff function and τ : Σ×XD ×XA ×{0, 1}∗ → Σ is
the randomized transition function linking the different states.
Thus, the payoff during round t depends on the current state (denoted σt) in addi-
tion to the actions of the defender (dt) and the adversary (at). This added flexibility
enables us to develop realistic game models for interactions where the rewards depend
on game history. The hospital-employee interaction we introduced earlier is one ex-
ample of such an interaction: an employee committing a given violation for the first
time is unlikely to meet the same punishment as an employee committing the same
violation for the tenth time.
A fixed strategy for the defender in a stochastic game is a function f : Σ → XD
mapping each state to a fixed action. F denotes the set of all fixed strategies.
In this section we demonstrate that there is no regret minimization algorithm for
the general class of stochastic games. More specifically for every notion of regret k
(oblivious (k = 0), k-adaptive, fully adaptive (k = ∞)) there is no k-adaptive min-
imization algorithm for the class of stochastic games. It suffices to consider ‘oblivious
regret’ against an oblivious adversary (see remark 5). The example in Theorem 6 is
fundamentally similar to example IV.1 of [25].
Theorem 6. There is a stochastic gameG such that for any defender strategiesD there
exists an oblivious adversary A such that
lim
T→∞
R¯k (D,A,G, T ) > 0 .
Proof. In particular, consider the stochastic game G illustrated in Figure 4. The figure
shows a game with two players D and A with action sets XD = {d1, d2} and XA =
{a1, a2} respectively. The reward function for the defender depends only on his own
action as well as the current state σ. Observe that σ2 is a sink state which the game
can never leave. If the game reaches this state then the defender will be continuously
rewarded in every round for the rest of the game. However, the only way to reach σ2 is
if the defender and the adversary play (d1, a1) simultaneously in some round t. If the
defender fails to play d1 then he might permanently miss his opportunity to reach σ2.
This suggests that the defender must always play d1. However, if the adversary never
plays a1 then it is best to use the fixed strategy always play d2.
Notice that for any A ∈ A0A and any defender strategy D we have
P¯ (D,A,G, T ) = P¯ (D,A0, G, T ) ,
because A = A0. Hence, R¯0 = R¯k whenever the adversary is oblivious.
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Remark 5. 1. IfD can minimize k-adaptive regret against any k-adaptive adversary
then D can minimize k-adaptive regret against any oblivious adversary (k = 0)
because
A0A ⊂ AkA .
2. IfD can minimize k-adaptive regret against any k-adaptive adversary thenD can
minimize k-adaptive regret against any oblivious adversary because R¯0 = R¯k
whenever the adversary is oblivious.
3. If D is a k-regret minimization algorithm a class of games G and G′ is a subclass
of G then D is also a k-regret minimization algorithm for the class of games G′.
σ 
2
σ 
1
d , a
1
1
d , a
2
2
d , *
*, *
1
P (d1, σ1) = −1 P (d1, σ2) = 1
P (d2, σ1) = 0 P (d2, σ2) = 1
Figure 4: A counterexample to prove Theorem 6
This example also illustrates why it is impossible to minimize fully adaptive regret
against a non-forgetful adversary. In particular a non-forgetful adversary could use the
states from 4 to decide whether or not to cooperate. Note that even if the adversary
can only see the last m outcomes (sliding window) the adversary could play to re-
mind himself of events arbitrarily long ago. For example, an adversary who wanted
to remember whether or not the defender played action d during round 1 might play a
special reminder action every m rounds when the latest reminder is about to go out of
memory.
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Algorithm 1 Assignment Recovery
• Input: D
• Input: MAX3SAT instance φ, with variables
x1, . . . , xn−1 ,
and clauses
C1, . . . , Cℓ ,
• De Bruin sequence: s0, ..., sn−1
• Initialize: Set t← 0, H ← ∅, T ← p(n), α∗ ← 0
• Round t: Set i← t mod n
1. Check 1: If t ≥ T then return.
2. Check 2: If our current assignment x1, ..., xn−1 satisfies y fraction of the
clauses where y > α∗ then set
xi∗ ← xi ,
and
α← y .
3. Select Clause: If i = 0 then select a new clause C uniformly at random
from C1, ..., Cℓ, and set H ′ = ∅.
4. Select Adversary Move:
ai ←


(si, 3) if i = 0;
(si, 1) if xi ∈ C;
(si, 0) if x¯i ∈ C;
(si, 2) otherwise.
5. Select Defender Move:
di ← D (Ht−i;H ′) ,
6. Update: Let Oi be the outcome and set
H ← H +
(
si, Oˆ
i
)
,
H ′ ← H ′ + (si, 0) ,
t← t+ 1 ,
xi ← di ,
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